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1. INTRODUCTION
A report by Institute of Nuclear Power Operation
(INPO) says that about 48% of the total events in nuclear
power plants (NPPs) for 2 years (2010-2011) are from
human errors [1]. A Korean database, OPIS (Operation
Performance Information System), also reports more than
20% of the total events in Korean NPPS during the past
10 years (2002-2011) are from human errors [2]. The most
severe NPP accidents in history such as TMI-2 and Cher-
nobyl are also strongly related to human errors [3, 4].
Human errors come in many types. Based on a survey of
recent events from the Korean NPPs, human operators
make mistakes due to working conditions that are unclear
or not very friendly with unfamiliar human machine
interfaces, fatigue, carelessness, and various reasons [5].
Then, how can we reduce human errors in existing NPPs?
There can be many, but five are suggested in this work.
The first is to increase automation so that humans do not
have to access the systems too much. The second is to
improve man machine interface systems (MMISs) which
include developing operation/maintenance support systems.
The third is to improve operating procedures for operators
or maintenance manuals for maintenance crews. This
improvement is not only making procedures/manuals
correct but also making them human friendly. The fourth
is to improve education and training of operation and
maintenance crews. The education and training for workers
from outside are more needed than for the in-house workers.
It is because workers from outside are not usually educated
well enough to work in NPPs. The education and training
can also be technical or non-technical. Technical education
and training is obvious, while non-technical education and
training for improving skills such as leadership, commu-
This paper aims to give an overview of the methods to inherently prevent human errors and to effectively mitigate the
consequences of such errors by securing defense-in-depth during plant management through the advanced man-machine
interface system (MMIS). It is needless to stress the significance of human error reduction during an accident in nuclear
power plants (NPPs). Unexpected shutdowns caused by human errors not only threaten nuclear safety but also make public
acceptance of nuclear power extremely lower. We have to recognize there must be the possibility of human errors occurring
since humans are not essentially perfect particularly under stressful conditions. However, we have the opportunity to
improve such a situation through advanced information and communication technologies on the basis of lessons learned from
our experiences. As important lessons, authors explained key issues associated with automation, man-machine interface,
operator support systems, and procedures. Upon this investigation, we outlined the concept and technical factors to develop
advanced automation, operation and maintenance support systems, and computer-based procedures using wired/wireless
technology. It should be noted that the ultimate responsibility of nuclear safety obviously belongs to humans not to
machines. Therefore, safety culture including education and training, which is a kind of organizational factor, should be
emphasized as well. In regard to safety culture for human error reduction, several issues that we are facing these days were
described. We expect the ideas of the advanced MMIS proposed in this paper to lead in the future direction of related
researches and finally supplement the safety of NPPs. 
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nication, and team cooperation, is equally important. Last
but not least is to enhance safety culture. The importance
of safety culture cannot be emphasized enough. Manage-
ment has tendency to emphasize the economical generation
of electricity rather than safety. They may push fellow
workers hard to accelerate the work process and reduce
the overhaul period, for example, due to economic reason.
“Safety first” may not be observed adequately in the real
world. This kind of insight for reducing human errors in
existing NPPs can be applied to the design of future NPPs.
Future NPPs which are not only highly automated but also
equipped with various operation support systems and many
maintenance support systems based on a variety of the state-
of-the-art information technologies (IT) can be thought to
be resistant to human errors. Also, the future NPPs in which
the workers are very well educated and trained, and have
strong safety culture, will be even more resistant to human
errors. These kinds of future NPPs can be called intelligent
or smart future nuclear power plants and considered to be
human error resistant.
Korea carried out a national project, called KNICS
(Korea Nuclear Instrumentation and Control Systems), to
localize the digital hardware which are used in NPPs during
2001-2010. However, this project is mainly for developing
hardware. Only very small amount of software was devel-
oped through this project. Many software are needed to
operate nuclear power plants economically and safely.
Developing automation systems, operator and maintenance
support systems, and computerized procedure systems are
activities to develop only a few of these types of software. 
The MMIS in NPPs have evolved. The first generation,
which started in 1950s and 60s, was fully analog. Old
type computers were used, but only for data logging and
an independent check of functions of the analog devices,
neither for control nor protection functions. The second
generation MMIS, which is still widely used is partially
digitalized, but is only used for non-safety functions such
as monitoring, not for safety or control purposes. The third
generation MMIS, which is now being developed and
introduced to NPPs, uses digital computers for control and
safety functions. However, there are not many applications
(software) to be used in NPPs yet. It is just the digital
replacement of the existing analog MMIS. The fourth
generation MMIS is expected to be the same as the third
one in appearance, but it will be well equipped with appli-
cation software, making it a very intelligent MMIS. We
are in the process of going to the fourth generation from the
third generation. And developing the automation systems,
the operation and maintenance support systems, and the
computerized procedure systems is part of the process. 
In Chapter 2, we will be surveying the five possible
ways of reducing human errors in more detail. In Chapter
3, however, we will be considering the first three ways of
reducing human errors in this work, that is, we will be
focusing on designing the advanced MMIS to reduce human
errors excluding education/training and safety culture. The
first way is to increase the automation. The second and
third ways are to improve the human machine interfaces,
but mainly on improving the support systems in operations
and tests, respectively. The second way is to improve
procedures for operations, but mainly focusing on devel-
oping computerized operation functions. Practically speak-
ing, the computerized operating procedure systems are
already being developed in many places including Korea
Hydro Nuclear Power Company - Central Research Institute
(KHNP-CRI) [6]. The operator support systems functions
which are suggested to be developed in this work can be
developed separately or as a part of the computerized
procedure systems. This decision will be made later.
Therefore, we will not be discussing the development of
computerized procedure systems in detail in this paper
since they are already being developed in many places.
However, for the case of implementing the operator support
systems functions in computerized procedure systems, we
will be discussing the possible way of implementing the
operator support functions in the computerized procedure
systems. The third way is to develop periodic test support
systems by implementing a periodic test procedure platform,
computerized periodic test procedures, communication
network infrastructure, and services for administrative
processes.   
2. KEY ISSUES IN ADVANCED MMIS 
This chapter focuses on five issues in developing the
fourth generation MMIS. The safety principle of the MMIS
should be the same as that of NPPs, which is defense-in-
depth. Human errors must be inherently and systematically
prevented, and the means to mitigate the consequence of
human errors once they occur should be provided in a
timely manner. The authors attempted to characterize the
responsibility of the advanced MMIS in terms of objectives
and means borrowing the concept of defense-in-depth in
Table 1. 
Inherent prevention of human errors seems impossible,
but organizational factors can minimize the possibility. We
consider safety culture as a top priority in designing the
MMIS as well. Education and training can build qualified
human infrastructure so that all personnel can perform
adequate tasks no matter what situation happens in field.
Of course, all the significant tasks should be clearly written
in procedures, and operators or maintenance crews should
follow the procedures under supervision for cross checking.
Even though good procedures are present, human errors
are likely to happen in an emergency condition due to high
stress. Upon task analysis, the level of automation should
be decided and the proper methods for automation should
be provided. Finally, no matter what human errors or equip-
ment failures occur, we should have the opportunities to
recover them. The consequence of human errors may be
soothed by the system’s inherent tolerance but the operator’s
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recovery actions should follow up most cases. The intel-
ligent operator support systems aim to provide the means
to detect such human errors in a timely manner and to allow
personnel to take appropriate actions without mistakes.
The detailed issues to implement the essential means were
summarized as follows: 
2.1 Automation
From the definition of Wikipedia, automation is the use
of machines, control systems, and information technologies
to optimize productivity in the production of goods and
delivery of services. Automation greatly decreases the
need for human sensory and mental requirements while
increasing load capacity, speed, and repeatability. The
automation of NPPs pursues the reduction of manual tasks
for accomplishing power generation and safety functions
in NPP operations. 
Automation is employed to achieve more reliable and
precise control. This is positive from a reliability standpoint,
since personnel are considered one of the more unpredictable
components in the system. Thus, automation can enhance
overall system reliability by removing or reducing the need
for human action [7]. Also, automation is required due to
the following necessary aspects:
1) It can ensure the operation with accuracy, reliability,
and operating speed that transcends the ability of the
human.
2) It can substitute humans’ operation and work in an
environment harmful to humans or not accessible to
workers and operators.
3) By reducing the workload, the stress on an operator or
the number of operators and workers can be reduced.
Human errors could be reduced radically by reducing
the parts of man-machine interaction through improved
and increased automation. However, excessive automation
can lead to a lack of concentration for operators or can
lead to side effects such as a lack of situational awareness.
Figure 1 shows the work performance according to the
workload [8]. As shown in this figure, excessive automation
reduces the work performance of operators. Therefore, it
is required to achieve the appropriate level of automation.
In Figure 2 and Table 2, the level of automation is
categorized into 10 classes by Endsley, et al. [9] even if
other researchers provided different scales of levels of
automation [10]. 
It is important to understand the effects of poor auto-
mation design on operations staff; summarized below [7]:
1) Automation can add to the overall complexity of the
I&C (Instrumentation and Control) systems. If
operators do not understand automation, it is difficult
for them to properly monitor and supervise its actions.
2) When functions and tasks are performed not by
Table 1. Defense-in-Depth Concept for Reducing Human Errors
Levels of Defense in Depth
1
2
3
4
Objectives
Prevention of abnormality
Control of abnormality
Control of accident
Mitigation of control failures
Essential Means
Safety Culture, Education and Training
Procedures / Supervision
Procedures / Manual Action / Automation 
Intelligent Operator Support Systems
Fig. 1. Personnel Performance versus Workload
Fig. 2. Automation Dimension Used by US NRC (Nuclear
Regulatory Commission)
operators but automation, it is usually difficult for
operators to remain aware of the function status. 
3) Automation shifts operator workload from that
associated with direct control to that associated with
monitoring. When functions and tasks are automated, it
can impact the ability of operators and workers to
skillfully perform them.
4) Since automation works very well most of the time,
operators trust in it. They can sometimes become
complacent and not monitor its performance effec-
tively.
Thus, in addition to designing automation itself, it is
crucial to design the human-system interaction as well. An
understanding of the impact on human roles and responsi-
bilities can help design more effective that avoids many of
these negative effects. It is notable that as more sophisticated
digital automation techniques will be developed along with
improved automation platforms, the level of automation
could be increased. 
The major features of the fourth generation MMIS are
summarized below:
• Advanced computer and software technology 
• Advanced digital control and protection technology
• Enhanced automation of operation and maintenance
• Improved sensors
All these characteristics are associated with NPP auto-
mation. The third and fourth features are directly related
to NPP automation. 
Figure 3 shows the typical activities for achieving
functions and tasks. Operation staff (in manual control) or
automatic systems must continuously monitor the plant
through sensors to detect the corresponding conditions
when functions and tasks are required to be performed.
They must assess the situation and plan a response. Once
the response plan is made, they implement the plan by
sending control signals to actuators.
The four generic activities are addressed to pursue the
automation of NPPs [7]: 
• Automation of monitoring and detection
• Automation of situation assessment
• Automation of response planning
• Automation of plant control
1) Automation of monitoring and detection 
Current safety and control variable measurements
depend on conventional processes and radiation
sensors including: 
• Temperature (resistance temperature detectors,
thermocouples)
• Pressure (diaphragm, piezoelectric)
• Flowrate (pressure difference through flow restrictor)
• Neutron flux (fission chamber, ion chamber)
Also, there are a relatively small number of smart
sensors, equipped with some signal processing techniques.
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Table 2. Allocation Roles for Endsley's Levels of Automation
Roles
Automation level
1. Manual Control
2. Action Support
3. Batch Processing
4. Shared Control
5. Decision Support
6. Blended Decision Making
7. Rigid System
8. Automated Decision Making
9. Supervisory Control
10. Full Automation
human
human/automation
human/automation
human/automation
human/automation
human/automation
human/automation
human/automation
human/automation
automation
human
human
human
human/automation
human/automation
human/automation
automation
human/automation
automation
automation
human
human
human
human
human
human/automation
human
automation
automation
automation
human
human/automation
human/automation
human/automation
human/automation
human/automation
human/automation
human/automation
human/automation
automation
Monitoring
Generating performance
options
Selecting the option to
be performed
Implementing the option
Fig. 3. Generic Activities for Achieving Functions and Tasks
However, the newest instrumentation systems incorporate
many pieces of information at the lowest level, leading
ultimately to highly processed information through inte-
gration and interpretation of this data. Greater intelligence
is being built into individual sensors, allowing more self-
checking and self-calibration, and also providing the capa-
bility for multiple variables to be measured and combined
to improve condition monitoring [7]. Also, optical commu-
nication and optical sensors will be extensively applied
in the future.
2) Automation of situation assessment
Situation assessment will be supported with automated
diagnostics and prognostics capabilities. Diagnostics is
typically used to identify and determine the causes of
symptoms and determine mitigations for problems. Prog-
nostics is focused on predicting the time at which a system
or a component will no longer perform its intended function.
Fast computing power, smart sensors, and data commu-
nications will be developed and then noble diagnostics and
prognostics technologies will be implemented in NPPs in
the future. 
Through development in diagnostics and prognostics,
operators will be able to predict future states of the plant
and take action proactively, as opposed to monitoring the
current state and reacting to change s or fault indications.
Extensive computational capabilities will include the
capability to run models and simulations faster than real
time and will allow personnel to play “what-if”  scenarios,
or to replay events with tests of various hypotheses as part
of diagnosis and response planning [7].
3) Automation of response planning 
Human response to both normal and emergency situa-
tions is governed by plant operation procedures. Currently,
the proper human responses to a situation are determined
in advance and operators perform a proper response ac-
cording to paper-based procedures. However, the new
computer-based procedures (CBPs) enable many aspects
of the response, including data gathering, assessing proce-
dure step logic, determining action, and taking action, to
be automated. 
4) Automation of plant control
From the viewpoint of current NPP I&C situation, NPP
I&C systems are not largely different from their very old
basic design. NPP I&C systems yet maintains primarily
single-input and single-output classical control structure
to automate individual control loops. 
A nuclear reactor is a complex system that requires
highly sophisticated controllers to ensure that desired
performance and safety can be achieved and maintained
during its operations. Higher-demanding operational
requirements such as reliability, lower environmental
impacts, and improved performance under adverse condi-
tions in nuclear power plants, coupled with the complexity
and uncertainty of the models, necessitate the use of an
increased level of automation in the control methods [11].
2.2 Man Machine Interface and Operator Aid
Two different kinds of tasks must be covered by a
human operator: normal operation and emergency operation.
Each kind of task includes various control actions. Generally,
control functions are assigned to (1) personnel, (2) automatic
control, or (3) combinations of personnel and automatic
control [12]. In consideration of the cases when unexpected
circumstances happen, which are not suitable to be handled
by a fully automated control, a human operator needs to
take a role of plant control. Thus, in many cases, a human
operator needs to operate NPPs with some aid of an infor-
mation system. The operator’s roles are assigned as a
supervisory role, manual controller, and backup of auto-
mation. The supervisory role monitors the plant to verify
that the safety functions are accomplished. The manual
controller carries out manual tasks that the operator is
expected to perform. The backup of automation carries
out a backup role to automation or machine control. A
classical information-processing model [13] of human
operators is represented by different states at which infor-
mation gets transformed: (1) sensory processing, (2)
perception of information, (3) situation awareness, (4)
response planning, and (5) action execution. Of course
there is a feedback to check the result of action imple-
mentation. Each state of information processing requires
different information. 
Working memory and attention are limited resources
of human operators in the information-processing model.
Information can be lost due to the loss of attention resources
to keep it active, the overload of working memory, or the
interference from other information in working memory.
The limitation of working memory is closely related to the
attention resources. A human-friendly design of MMIS
will reduce the adverse effect of information overflow.
Because of this complexity, which is intrinsically
imposed on the operators who have a limitation of his/her
resources, the importance of MMIS is emphasized. In an
advanced MMIS, thanks to the high performance of com-
puter systems, a strengthened operator support system can
be provided in addition to some automation of control
functions. An advanced MMIS will support higher level
functions of the human operator unlike the conventional
ones. That is, the advanced MMIS will provide well-
processed information and sophisticated operator aids in
contrast to the conventional MMI, which focuses on the
placement of hard-wired process parameters and control
switches in an effective manner. This is one of the biggest
advantages of the introduction of digital technology in
NPPs. The MMIS will annunciate any abnormality in the
plant to an operator, display more information to the
operator, tailor displayed information to the operator's
current needs, support the operator's decision-making
process, and help the operator to recover from an incorrect
action if there is any. This issue is closely related to the
level of automations as described in the above section. 
First of all, the clear situation awareness of an operator
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needs to be supported by the MMIS. During an accident,
plant operators and technical support staff need access to
plant status, and monitor plant response to the actions taken.
The central safety problem in the design of an NPP is to
assure that radioactive fission products remain safely con-
fined at all times during the operation of the NPPs, refueling
of the reactor, and the preparation and shipping of spent
fuels [14] under possible accident conditions. The safety of
an NPP will be in danger only if there are multiple failures
of safety related equipment, serious human errors, or some
combinations of these two conditions. That is, NPP operators
will be greatly benefited if they are supported by advanced
plant status information systems.
They also need to infer likely plant response to possible
mitigative actions as well as the near-term plant behavior
in the absence of mitigative actions. The use of a simulator
will provide the proper means to satisfy these needs. The
main task of a predictive simulator is to inform the staff
about what will happen in the near future. Another task is
to allow the operator to test mitigation strategies before
they are actually carried out on the plant. To be of any use,
the speed of such a predictive simulator must be faster
than real time, actually much faster [15]. This high speed
requirement may induce the use of response-surface models
rather than the physics-based models. 
In summary, the successful management of this com-
plicated accident situation, which must be performed by
both human operators and computer systems, requires a
successful collaboration of them. The MMIS should support
the operators to diagnose the occurrence of an accident, to
determine the extent of challenge to plant safety, to monitor
the performance of automatic systems, to select strategies
to prevent or mitigate the safety challenge, to implement
strategies, and to monitor their effectiveness [15]. 
On the other hand, the malfunction of this MMIS causes
a serious safety issue because if a safety system fails during
an emergency, the plant will not be secured and catastrophic
consequences might occur. Therefore, when designing
safety systems, one often strives to achieve the lowest
unavailability possible. Computerized operator support
systems potentially have negative consequences without
sufficient consideration of the strategies and, furthermore,
may become a new burden on the operators [12]. Experi-
mental study [16] shows that the advanced MMIS may
result in different effects on the operator performance with
the level of operator expertise. Computerized operator
support systems need to be consistent in both content and
format with the cognitive strategies and mental models
employed by the operator. 
2.3 Procedures
Procedure is recognized as one of the effective tech-
niques to reduce human errors in NPPs as well as in other
industries. The procedure normally outlines prescriptions
of techniques or tasks that should be followed by personnel
in the various situations. Procedures assist operators to
make decisions in diagnosing the possibility of different
kinds of system failure and can be helpful in avoiding
biases often encountered in human information processing
[17]. Procedures can also reduce the omission of required
actions in the situation or the intervention of unnecessary
actions performed by plant personnel. 
In a broad sense, the procedures used in NPPs include
administrative procedures, operating procedures (normal,
alarm response, abnormal, and emergency procedures),
maintenance and technical support procedures, and testing
and surveillance procedures [18]. Administrative proce-
dures describe how administrative aspects of NPP activities
are carried out, such as review and approval of documents,
training, and qualification of NPP personnel, and mainte-
nance and retention of plant records. Operating procedures
provide operators with the instructions that predefine actions
taken in different operating conditions. Maintenance and
technical support procedures relate to activities such as
the conduct of preventive and corrective maintenance,
radiation protection, and chemistry control. Testing and
surveillance procedures relate to activities such as func-
tional tests of safety systems, post-maintenance text
procedures, and post modification procedures. Since the
procedures form a principal interface between NPP per-
sonnel and the plant, they should be technically correct,
comprehensive, explicit, and easy to use. In order to
develop and maintain such procedures, NPPs are expected
to apply (1) the measures for document control [19], (2)
generic technical guidelines [20], and 3) accepted human
factors, principles, and practices for the design of procedures
[21]. With the measure for document control, it is assured
that procedures are reviewed for adequacy and approved
for release by authorized personnel and distributed to and
used at the location where the prescribed activity is per-
formed. The generic technical guidelines that are usually
provided by vendors include technical bases to develop
procedures such as plant design bases, technical require-
ments, and specifications. Human factors principles and
practices for the design of the procedures are also applied
to ensure that procedures are comprehensive, understand-
able, and easy to use for operators. Those principles and
practices for development and revision of procedures are
normally established in a procedure writer’s guide. The
procedure writer’s guide contains the introductions about
structure, organization, contents format, and use of acronyms
and abbreviations [22]. Finally, for any procedure to be
usable, it is important that each procedure should be verified
and validated in an adequate way. 
Procedures can be categorized into paper-based pro-
cedure (PBP) and computer-based procedure according
to the means of implementation. PBPs are more popular
in existing analog type NPPs. PBPs are a printed form of
instructions, available in a place easily accessible by the
personnel who carry out the task. However, PBPs have
characteristics limiting the manner in which information
is presented, and impose tasks upon operators that are not
directly related to controlling the plant [23]. Operator
performance issues related to PBPs are well summarized
in [23]. Some of them specific to PBPs are: 
• Difficulty in managing multiple procedures simulta-
neously
• Lack of context-dependent highlighting and navigation
• Separation from other information sources such as
safety parameter display systems
• Potential for skipping a step and missing a procedure
transition
By applying the ITs, CBPs are becoming a part of
control room elements for new NPPs as well as modernized
NPPs. CBPs are also implementing features that address
to varying degrees some of the problems associated with
PBPs. Some of the positive effects of CBPs on operator
performances are reducing task completion time, workload,
and operator’s errors in transition between procedures.
CBPs can be designed to provide different levels of func-
tionality, including varying levels of automation. Three
different categories of CBPs can be defined according to
the functionality provided [24]. The Type 1 of CBP presents
procedures on a computer driven display in text or graphical
form with little additional functionality. This type is essen-
tially a replica of PBPs. The Type 2 CBP incorporates
additional functionality not found in PBPs, such as automatic
retrieval and display of the information, automatic pro-
cessing of step logic and display of results to support
operator decision making, and access to soft control through
links to a human-system interface system. This type of
CBP does not include the ability to send control commands.
The Type 3 CBP is more automated-systems. This type
can include procedure-based automation, in which the CBP
can automatically carry out multiple procedure steps when
directed by the operator. More detailed description on the
functionality of each type of CBP can be found in [24]. 
Although CBPs address many problems of PBPs, some
human performance issues related to CBPs have been
raised by several studies. One issue is the possibility that
communication between operators may be reduced. Differ-
ently from PBPs, most of the information required for
following procedure can be available in CBPs. Thus, the
operator may not feel the necessity to communicate with
the other operators to obtain the information. The potential
for isolating a CBP user from the other operators may
undermine team performance in emergencies. Another
issue is that operators may not maintain situation awareness
with highly automated CBPs. For example, with the Type
3 CBP, procedural steps can be executed by the system
without an operator’s intervention. The operators may be
out of the control loop and thereby lose good situation
awareness about the plant. This is a typical human factors
issue of highly automated systems. The third issue is the
keyhole effect. The keyhole effect may become significant
when operators are working with multiple procedures. If
operators are so focused on a portion of the procedure that
can be observed in the small space of display, they may lose
a sense of orientation in the total set of active procedures.
The fourth issue is the transition to the backup PBP in the
case of CBP failure. If the CBP in use fails due to any
reason, operators need to move to the backup PBP. This
transition should not be complicated and the sufficient
information for continuous operation with the backup
PBP, e.g., the operation history up to the moment, should
be provided for the operators. The means through which
operators can recognize system failures, e.g., alarm or
heartbeat display, need to be provided on the display system.
More human factors issues and design guidelines with
PBPs are given by the NRC and the EPRI (Electric Power
Research Institute) [23, 24].
Procedures need to be integrated into a coordinated
effort with the other approaches for reducing human errors.
First of all, procedures should be consistent with automatic
systems and human-system interface. Procedures should
include the interaction between automatic systems and
operators. In this light, the procedures should define the
operator’s tasks to monitor automatic systems and the tasks
performed when the automatic system is malfunctioning.
For the human-system interface, the information and
control devices that are required to carry out the tasks in
the procedures should be presented on the human-system
interface in a proper manner. Second, a training program
also needs to consider the inputs from procedure develop-
ment to maximize effectiveness. The inputs are related to
determining what procedures are required for training, who
needs to be trained, or what the learning objectives of
training are. For instance, tasks that were identified as
problematic in developing procedures (e.g., procedural steps
that underwent extensive revision) need to be included in
the training program [20]. In addition, the training program
also needs to emphasize the procedures to handle the situa-
tions which the operators cannot nearly experience due to
the low probability of situations happening, but which have
the potential for a significant threat to safety. Examples of
the procedures are emergency operating procedures and
severe accident management guidelines. 
2.4 Education and Training
The education and training of qualified and capable
engineers should be one of the most significant issues
during the entire life cycle of NPPs, which is also commonly
shared in all countries. 
The purpose of the education and training is to foster
engineers’ fundamental capability to successfully perform
their tasks without faults or errors by learning key knowl-
edge and repeatedly practicing the procedures. However,
we have to agree that procedures cannot cover all tasks
which are necessary for normal as well as emergency
conditions no matter how carefully the procedures are
prepared and written as shown in the left of Figure 4.
Additionally, it is not easy to guarantee that all engineers
have a full knowledge of the procedures even though the
education and training programs are provided. Therefore,
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we have to say that education and training may not deal
with the real world as expected. Yet from another viewpoint,
we can expect some positive potential. If engineers get to
know more fundamental principles which are not explicitly
presented in the procedures and their application, it is likely
for them to wisely manage unforeseen cases which are not
described in the procedures as shown on the right side of
Figure 4. 
During a normal condition, most tasks are routinely
performed in such a way that the education and training
for these tasks emphasizes procedure follow-up without
mistakes. Even for conditions other than a normal situation,
the procedures or guidelines are provided and operators
exercise them repeatedly. However, there must be excep-
tional conditions which are not addressed in the procedures
due to epistemic uncertainty or the lack of plant information.
In this case, the procedures are of no use. For instance, a
few white papers on the Fukushima accident in 2011
indicated the operators’ mistake not to take relevant actions
in a timely manner because there was no corresponding
direction in their procedures [25~27]. In conclusion, the
point of the education and training can be summarized by
reducing human errors during prescribed conditions and
improving human decision-making during exceptional
conditions.
There are a lot of case studies and lessons-learned
published for better education and training. [28~32].
However, it does not seem that a certain standardized
approach for education and training is present due to
deviations in country, generation, and culture, which is
different from other technical issues. Moreover, since we
can recognize the outcome of education and training after
a long investment, it is not easy for companies to keep
continuous attention on this issue. Nevertheless it is obvious
that the ultimate responsibility of nuclear safety should
belong to humans no machines, so it is essential to secure
a system for continuous quality improvement of education
and training. Considering a few factors that we are facing,
for instance, the growing concerns over nuclear safety, the
active development of information and communication
technologies, and specific circumstances in Korea, several
issues are summarized below:
1) Education and training for subcontractors 
For better business management, the tasks belonging
to utility are getting transferred to subcontractors. Utility
or main-contractors can have programs to foster the capa-
bility of engineers employed in the company, and engineers
can also gain in-depth professional knowledge in the com-
pany through which career stability is relatively guaranteed.
On the other hand, subcontractors are not likely to have
enough essential education and/or training program partici-
pation. Their turnover is higher, so keeping qualified
capability is not easy. Furthermore, engineers’ attachment
to their job is normally different depending on their career
status. It should be noted that main-contractors have to
keep a minimum capability to deal with any abnormal
situations even though there is no help from subcontractors
in the event that they are not available. Considering this,
main-contractors and subcontractors should be balanced
in terms of securing qualified capability.
2) Education and training for tacit knowledge
Though there is a difference among countries, the
current trend is that private inclination is becoming stronger
than organizational devotion. As organizational devotion
is stronger, the possibility of transferring tacit knowledge
is more likely, which is sometimes more useful than explicit
knowledge written in manuals or procedures. The ability
to operate and maintain complex plant equipment requires
a kind of knowledge that is not always known explicitly.
The transfer of tacit knowledge is tapering off. This tendency
is accelerated when junior members are not hired steadily.
Frequent position circulation can be another reason. The
primary remedy to overcome this situation should be to
systematically transfer explicit knowledge. However the
tacit knowledge seems to be indispensable. Education and
training must take care of explicit and tacit knowledge in
a balanced manner. 
3) Education and training for lesson-learned from wrong
cases
We can learn lessons from either good cases or wrong
cases. Lesson-Learned from experience is a significant
and effective method as education and training, but it is
not easy to learn wrong cases in particular since those are
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Fig. 4. Comparison of Limitation (Left) and Potential (Right) of Education and Training
not clearly reported in practice. Unless there is no obligatory
rule, nobody wants to report wrong cases to the public. It
is still fine that such wrong cases are circulated and referred
to by all members within a company, but it can also be
difficult when an individual plant, site, or branch is under
competition with each other for business purposes. The
causes associated with human or organizational errors such
as inexpressibly private circumstances, team discord, and
excessive workload are hard to document. Case reports
usually describe accident scenarios and measures taken,
but causes, including technical and non-technical issues,
should be covered. 
4) Education and training for non-technical factors
The non-technical factor mentioned in this section is
related to ethical or psychological aspects of plant employ-
ees. After investigating unexpected shutdowns in Korea,
many of the events were caused not by the lack of technical
capability but rather psychological exhaustiveness. For
instance, no matter how perfect a procedure is, a mainte-
nance crew member skips a few steps at his or her discretion.
While the quality of procedures is a pre-requisite, advanced
systematic interlocks to prevent such mistakes should
support plant personnel. More emphasis on non-technical
factors is also necessary in collaboration with social science. 
2.5 Safety Culture
Safety culture was forged to describe the causes of
the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Safety culture is organi-
zational culture where everybody places safety first in
every activity. Culture is for organization what personality
is for the individual. Safety culture is invisible and intangible.
All the processes and decisions, however, are influenced
by safety culture. Many people ask what safety culture is
and how safety culture is fostered. It looks difficult to
devise a process to increase safety culture because safety
culture does not stand alone. Safety culture is like an
adverb rather than a verb. An adverb always comes with
a verb. If safety culture is reflected in the statement ‘close
a valve’, the statement becomes ‘safely close a valve’. A
similar concept is found in the audit and quality assurance
system. If individuals are armed with safety culture, the
adverb ‘safely’ can be omitted to get rid of the written
burden. Safety culture is sometimes misused to hide the
responsibility of a human or organization, or the actual
root cause of events. Safety culture sound ambiguous like
political terminology. 
Culture in principle has evolved while organization is
adapting to social environment. Because organization
consists of individuals, can culture be calculated by adding
the sum of individuals' personalities? The answer is that
culture forms a different domain from the sum of person-
alities. For example, the western culture has evolved re-
specting personal rights; whereas each person in the oriental
culture has been trained to follow the culture shaped by
leaders. In both cases, even weak human beings can build
a strong safety culture by desiring ideal organization. 
The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)
published guidelines on safety culture [33]. The NRC,
however, had been reluctant to introduce safety culture
until corrosion was found at the Davis-Besse reactor head
in 2002. The U.S. had believe that safety culture could be
intimidated in the a closed society such as Eastern Europe
in the past. The NRC has published the final safety culture
statement in 2012 after intensive discussion. The Korean
nuclear power industry, however, has not hesitated to
introduce new concepts from both the IAEA and NRC. 
After the Fukushima accident, Korean society has
been keen on the operation of NPPs. Korean NPPs have
invested a large budget to mitigate the consequences of a
natural disaster beyond design basis events. It seemed that
Korean NPPs had been well prepared until the station
blackout at Kori 1. However public acceptance of NPPs has
dropped significantly after Kori 1 hid the station blackout
for 12 minutes in 2012. Both events have changed the
Korean social environment. Residents and Korean scientists
consider NPPs as a potential hazard to society. They try
to eliminate latent defects in NPPs.
Safety culture can be observed in behaviors or appear
in artifacts such as workflow, procedure, and policy. Accord-
ing to Schein, safety culture has three level layers [34].
The top layer is artifacts. When the artifacts are adhered
as written, the level of safety culture can be increased.
Figure 5 shows the hierarchy from the safety culture
layer to a real plant. Nuclear plants are supported by many
processes. Safety culture resides below the process layer.
Therefore, safety culture is not directly linked to the real
plant. Both the human layer and process layer are heavily
influenced by the safety layer. The NRC regards safety
culture roughly as human performance, safety conscious
work environment, and problem identification and resolution
in the reactor oversight process. These elements are core
elements for all processes, and called cross-cutting area
in the reactor oversight process.
The safety culture layer in Korean nuclear power plants
is further structured within the safety culture model. The
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Fig. 5. Relationship between Safety Culture and Plant
model consists of the safety culture definition, principles,
and action statements. KHNP safety culture is defined as
safety culture is organizational member belief and behavior
to place safety in the first priority Safety culture principles
are listed as follows. They are similar to those of other
organizations because safety culture is a universal concept
[35~38]. 
• Everybody is responsible for safety
• Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety
• Everybody has a questioning attitude
• The working environment is safety conscious
• Continuously learning and improving organization
is embraced.
• Processes to foster safety are implemented
Traditionally, Korean society had been governed by
strong Confucian cultures. The culture had refrained
Koreans from expressing their thoughts to their seniors.
After the collapse of the Chosun dynasty, Korea adopted
capitalism and is a society full of dynamics. Lots of students
have been trained abroad, but failed to learn the western
culture
3. TECHNICAL APPROACHES
Chapter 3 proposes specific technical approaches to
implement the issues mentioned in Chapter 2. The proposed
approaches are selected on the basis of the statistics from
OPIS [2]. Table 3 shows the prioritized causes of human
errors in Korean NPPs between 1978 and 2008. 
From Table 3, while the 2nd and 3rd groups belong to
design fault, the others are associated with operational
fault and these exceed 2/3 of the entire causes. Therefore,
three facts can be drawn to reduce the majority of human
errors during the operational phase: (1) crews should have
enough time to execute procedures, otherwise tasks need
to be automated, (2) all information for interactive tasks
should be shared without loss, and (3) the supervisory
steps to check the initial and end states of tasks should be
reinforced. Fortunately, the above facts can be practically
implemented as long as advanced IT is merged with the
current MMIS. Upon these observations, this chapter
addresses the overview, methodologies, and expected
benefit of advanced automation, operator support systems,
and test support systems as the methods of materializing
lessons-learned.
3.1 Advanced Automation
Automation was described in a broad sense in Section
2.1. Now, two approaches of automation to be applied to
commercial NPPs will be described in a narrow sense
directly related to operation control. The first approach is
to increase the level of automation in a full range of NPP
operations to significantly reduce the human error. The
second one is to improve the operation performance by
applying advanced control algorithms to a variety of control
systems of NPPs. 
1) Increasing the level of automation in a full range of
operations
Since NPPs take charge of the base load in supplying
electricity, NPPs are operated at high power most of the
time. Therefore, they are completely automated at high
power. Table 4 shows the level of automation and the
number of plant shutdowns due to human errors in each
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Table 3. Analysis of Human Errors in NPPs between 1978~2008
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
Personnel or Team
Procedures/Orders/Drawings
Human System Interface
Management / Organization
Communication
Supervision
Inadequate activities by personnel or teams
Inadequate information of written materials 
Design errors in alarm / indicator / controllers
Insufficiency of preparation
Omission of information to be shared
Omission of supervisory activities 
137
52
33
20
15
15
Grouping Causes Numbers (Counts overlapped)
Table 4. Automation Level and the Number of Plant Shutdown due to Human Errors in Each Operation Mode (Inadvertent
Shutdown Cases from 2002 to 2011 of OPIS)
Reactor Power
Heat-up/cool-down
operation (<5%)
Low power operation 
(5-15%)
Level of automation
Number of plant shutdown
Ratio (%)
Manual
12
33
Manual/Auto
13
36
Auto
11
31
-
36
100
High power operation
(15-100%)
Total
operation mode. The heat-up/cool-down operation and
low power operation are very short in time but their ratios
at the number of plant shutdowns are significant. Therefore,
it is required to increase the level of automation in the
operation modes, including heat-up/cool-down and low
power operations to reduce human errors in these operation
modes. Figure 6 shows typical operation mode and auto-
mation level in PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor) plants.
Human errors must be significantly reduced by mitigating
operators’ workload and minimizing operator intervention
through automated operation in the operation modes.
Even if it is difficult to design completely automated
control systems for a full range of operations including
heat-up, low power, high power, and cool-down operations,
it is necessary to reduce human errors by greatly increasing
the current levels of automation. Actually, it is not difficult
to automate the startup operation if no disturbances occur.
However, a simple procedure cannot respond to the tran-
sients or abnormalities that may occur during startup.
Looking into research concerning the NPP startup operation,
Berkan et al. [41] have proposed an automated startup
control system for the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II
(EBR-II). Due to the presence of plant nonlinearities over
the startup period, they used intelligent techniques such
as reconstructive inverse dynamics, fuzzy logic, and neural
networks to develop the controllers. In Korea, Kim et al.
[39] have presented a preliminary study for the heat-up
operation. At present, Ohi 3 and 4 units in Japan perform
automated operation during plant heat-up and cool-down.
Since applying the automation to heat-up and cool-down
operations in Ohi 3 and 4 units, it is reported that manip-
ulation frequencies and monitoring frequencies were
reduced by 60% and 75% as compared with conventional
manual operation [40]. Operators’ burden will be reduced
as the operating frequencies are reduced, which can reduce
human errors. The reduction of human errors can contribute
to increasing public acceptance, preventing the inadvertent
plant shutdown.  
2) Advanced control algorithms
Most control systems of current commercial NPPs use
conventional PID controllers and lead/lag compensators.
To improve the plant performance, it is required to design
control systems equipped with advanced control algorithms
and also suggested to replace the conventional control
systems with the advent of the computing platform of
highly efficient distributed control systems. Therefore, it
is necessary to actively apply and implement advanced
control algorithms being used widely in general industries. 
For this reason, more advanced control methods and
algorithms have been studied by many researchers [42-49]
in nuclear fields and realistically applied to a great degree
in other industries. Further advances in control methods
will be made and NPPs are expected to take advantage of
them in order to help meet their overall operational perfor-
mance and safety objectives. The advanced control methods
include optimal control, robust control, model predictive
control, fuzzy logic control, neural network-based control,
adaptive control, and so forth. Multiple combined control
methods will also be applied to assist autonomous operation
of NPPs to achieve optimum performance. 
The followings are representative control topics to
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Fig. 6. Typical Operation Mode and Automation Level in PWR
which these advanced control algorithms can be applied and
whose control performance can be improved: 
• Water level control of steam generators
• Reactor power control
• Load-following operation
It is desired to establish more automated operations for
a full range of operation by using the advanced controllers
for detailed control problems. 
3.2 Operator Support Systems
As mentioned in Section 2.2, successful accident
management can be expected through the collaboration
of human operators and computer systems. The functions
which must be performed can be categorized into four
tasks: information acquisition, situation identification,
adoption of control decisions, and implementation of
decisions. The effective support of these tasks by using
advanced MMI would lead to better performance of
accident management. In this sense, in addition to well-
organized display of information, the operator support
systems explained in this section are expected to be
deployed in the near future to improve the safety of NPPs.
1) Plant status information system
Plant status must be accessed by the human operators
both in normal operation and an emergency situation.
The effectiveness of plant status recognition is one of the
keys to enhance the mitigation success probability. If the
controls of all safety components are not automated, the
operators will be under serious time pressure to cope with
a sudden accident. It is well known that the change of
available time considerably affects the human error prob-
ability and results in a big difference of actuation success
probability of safety components [50]. 
The plant status deviation from its normal condition
can be detected by a computer system even before the
process parameters reach alarm set points. This will give
an earlier warning for the operators and more time to
determine proper counter measures and implement safety
actions. The primary function of a plant status monitoring
system is to provide this kind of early alarm of plant status
deviation. Its secondary function would be to provide a
cue to determine the specific status of a plant. This will
enhance the human operator’s capability.
This secondary function could be interpreted to the
diagnostic function. The system will support human operator
to diagnose the root cause of plant deviation or will provide
a list of suspected causes by using automated diagnostics
algorithm. There is a big difference between these two
functions. It is notable that the system may mislead the
operators into a wrong conclusion and cause the loss of
very important time to cope with deviation. The level of
automation in diagnostics must be decided in consideration
of the possibility or probability that the automated system
fails to trace correct root causes.
On the other hand, this plant status information can
be utilized by plant maintenance personnel for checking
the plant status and for ensuring the planned maintenance
action will not cause a serious disturbance of plant operation. 
2) Response prediction system
When accident situation occurs, the plant response to
possible operator actions needs to be identified before
actions are actually implemented. The operators also need
to know the result of an omission of required actions. Even
very knowledgeable and skillful plant operators might
feel difficulty in performing this kind of prediction since
they would be under a stressful condition caused by time
pressure. The plant response prediction system will help
the operators to reduce the prediction task burden and
allow for checking the suitability of planned actions in a
more flexible manner.
The direct use of a very fast simulator would be one
of the possible approaches. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the
high speed requirement may induce the use of response-
surface models rather than physics-based models of which
computer simulations do not give enough speed at this time.
Real physical-law-based simulations such as computational
fluid dynamics models are far slower than real time. 
The relationships among safety actions, some critical
process parameters, and plant response variables will be
the basis of response-surface models. Statistical models
or correlations among variables would be used for this
purpose. However, it should be noted that this model is
only an approximation. Thus if we do not have enough
knowledge to develop it to the extent of possible use during
accidents, the response prediction system will mislead
the operators to an incorrect conclusion. The coverage of
a response prediction system would be identified before
we deploy it.
3) Recovery support system 
One of the significant merits of human-computer
collaboration is the enhanced possibility of recovery of
faulty actions. The human operators tend to make various
kinds of mistakes. The computer system could check the
adequacy of a human action before it is transmitted to
field controllers. 
Primitive recovery support can be achieved by just
asking to the operator what he/she actually intended to do.
If the operator reads this verification message, there will
be a greater chance of recovery from faulty manipulation.
Some advanced features can be added to this. A rule-based
checking algorithm is one of the feasible techniques to
validate an operator’s actions. For a given plant status or an
emergency operation procedure, expected operator actions
can be treated in the form of a rule-based model. The
relationships or sequence of actions can also be covered.
The combined use with a plant response prediction
system and a computerized procedure system will be a more
sophisticated way of operator action validation. The most
advanced recovery support system would provide the rec-
ognition of fault actions and the possible recovery actions
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which are available at that moment in consideration of
plant status.
4) Maintenance information system
Maintenance of safety-critical equipment may cause
unavailability of safety functions. Thus this would be one
important piece of information that the plant operators
need to know in addition to the process parameters. A
maintenance information system covers two different
factors: the recognition of safety functions’ availability
and the reduction of their unavailable time.
The first factor, the recognition of safety functions’
availability, can be addressed by gathering component
status information. Effective display of this information
will reduce the chance of human errors which might be
caused by control room operators or field maintenance
personnel. The provision of a well-established maintenance
procedure would be one possible way to address the second
factor, the reduction of safety functions’ unavailable time.
After maintenance, we also need to ensure that the safety
equipment is ready to be operated and the safety function
is available. 
Risk information also needs to be incorporated into
this system to enhance plant safety and economy. This
maintenance information system facilitates more effective
planning of maintenance and minimizes possible human
errors.
3.3 Periodic Test Support Systems
Among maintenance tasks performed in NPPs, the
periodic tests should be a key factor for keeping nuclear
safety. Under the Korean nuclear regulatory framework,
the technical specifications in the final safety analysis
report explicitly specify the list of tests and inspections to
satisfy the limits for operating conditions. The particular
procedures for such tests and inspections are provided by
the periodic test procedures. Since the periodic tests cover
the examination and investigation for safety-critical structure,
system, and components, a single mistake in performing
the tests can threaten the conditions of a power station. 
It is needless to note that there must be enough capable
engineers to promote the reliability of the periodic tests.
Aside from the aspect of human resources, we are able to
recommend a few ideas from previous experiences: (1)
All the information during the periodic tests should be
correctly shared among crews, (2) Each step should be
proactively verified, properly performed, and validated in
on-line manner, and (3) All administrative processes inclu-
ding the decision on pass or not of tests, history traceability,
and automatic reporting to interagency should be supported
to reduce excessive burden. Figure 7 illustrates how tech-
nologies can support these ideas in an NPP. 
Technical components required are as follows:
1) Procedure platform for periodic tests
The CBPs for operation have been set up for APR-
1400 so their platform was also completed. However, test
procedures are less standardized and formatted than oper-
ation procedures. A platform to develop, execute, and
maintain test procedures should be developed as a pre-
liminary step. 
2) Computerized periodic test procedures
The terminal for the periodic test procedures should
provide wired and wireless communication which can be
allowed in nuclear application. Obviously, EMI (Electro-
magnetic Interference) / RFI (Radio Frequency Interference)
should be validated not to make any unexpected malfunction
on other instrumentation and controls. Any possible envi-
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Fig. 7. Illustration of a Periodic Test Support System
ronment in a testing area such as radioactive exposure,
temperature, humidity, and any impact during usage to
successfully achieve all tasks should be taken into account. 
Aside from these hardware related requirements, the
functionality for software should be specified such as the
function to verify testing tasks, identify initial and final
conditions, and check supplementary operational infor-
mation. A remote coaching function is necessary to discuss
unresolved issues with advisory experts outside through
wired and/or wireless vision and/or voice connection,
which is useful to prevent tester’s mistakes and protect
the testing crew’s safety.  
3) Communication network infrastructure
Due to the nature of the periodic tests, the computerized
procedure should be mobile, so appropriate communication
infrastructure should be supported. There have been nu-
merous examples of using wired/wireless communication
technology for voice messaging, data transfer, radiation
monitoring, security surveillance, and process or equipment
condition monitoring in NPPs [51]. Nevertheless, commu-
nication networks within a nuclear island should be cautious
due to potential problems caused by EMI/RFI. Furthermore,
since cyber security is present and not fully guaranteed by
the regulatory body, computerized periodic test procedures
should be developed using wired or short-range wireless
infrastructure, as long as it is a prototype, while wireless
applications remain open. 
4) Services for administrative processes
The work orders of the periodic tests in Korean NPPs
are issued individually by the ERP (Enterprise Resource
Planning) operated by the utility. However the configuration
and scheduling of the entire tests is not effectively per-
formed. For instance, any of two tests which should be
performed exclusively are not under control. Traceability
for test records is not fully secured. The computerized
periodic test procedure needs to provide all necessary
administrative processes involved in the entire work order. 
Services for administrative processes can be summarized
as follows:
• Scheduling and management of entire periodic tests
• Indication of periodic tests currently performed 
• Warning and prevention for exclusive tests (a test
should not be performed with the other test at the
same time)
• Prioritization for periodic tests
• Management of track records (test logs and all their
revisions)
4. CONCLUSIONS
It is well known that events in NPPs are mainly caused
by human errors. In order to make NPPs safe and reliable,
therefore, we have to do our best to reduce human errors.
Many things can be done to reduce human errors in NPPs,
but we suggested five possible ways in this work. These
are to (1) automate NPP operations and maintenance as
much as possible, (2) improve MMIs for both operation and
maintenance to be as much fault free and human friendly
as possible, (3) improve operation and maintenance proce-
dures (4) thoroughly train and educate operators and main-
tenance people, and (5) improve safety culture. We first
reviewed each of these five methods. After that, we chose
only the ways in which we can achieve the human error
reducing goals by applying existing ITs or by using ad-
vanced MMIS. The answer is the automation of NPPs
and improving MMIs and procedures. We first tried to
find how to reduce human errors through the automation
of NPPs. By increasing the level of automation in a full
range of operations, we showed how much human errors
can be reduced based on existing data. We also commented
on various advanced control algorithms which were already
developed and demonstrated by many researchers. Second,
we tried to find how we can reduce human errors by devel-
oping operator support systems. We can develop systems
which support the human operations of diagnosis, decision
support, and execution validation. This integrated operation
support system can be a stand-alone system or incorporated
into the computerized operation procedure systems as
advanced functions. Finally, the test support systems can
be developed to reduce human errors. Maintenance people
make many mistakes while doing periodic testing work.
It can be due to improper working procedures or incomplete
communication between field test people and people inside
the control room. It is also from routine services such as
wrong loggings and so on. In order to reduce human errors
during the test, developing test support systems is strongly
recommended in this work. In addition to these efforts,
other things should be done simultaneously. One is the
training and education of operators and maintenance people,
not only in technical skills but also non-technical skills such
as communication, leadership, and cooperation. There is
also the matter of improving safety culture, which is also
very important to reduce human errors. Not keeping the
working procedure faithfully, hiding some important issues
related to NPP safety, and putting the economic importance
before the safety importance are all well-known examples
of improper safety culture of an organization. The Chernobyl
accident was a good example of improper safety culture.
In this work, we did not look into these training and safety
culture problems in detail. We only considered the ways
to improve NPP safety by reducing human errors utilizing
existing information technologies. We hope we can reduce
human errors substantially by developing the methods we
suggested in this work.  
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